--- title: "What the Iran war is teaching the US about air superiority" description: "The Iran war offers a real-world example of what air superiority actually means in modern conflict — and why the U.S. may be lagging behind." date: "2026-09-08" modified: "2026-09-08" authors: - name: "David Roza" job_title: "YouTube Writer/Editor" link: "https://taskandpurpose.com/authors/david-roza.md" url: "https://taskandpurpose.com/tech-tactics/iran-war-air-superiority-air-force/" categories: - "Aircraft" - "Tech & Tactics" - "Video" --- # What the Iran war is teaching the US about air superiority ![U.S. Air Force Airmen conduct a preflight inspection outside a U.S. Air Force KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility July 16, 2026. (U.S. Air Force Photo by Senior Airman Brooklyn Golightly)]() *Airmen conduct a preflight inspection outside a KC-135 Stratotanker. Air Force Photo by Senior Airman Brooklyn Golightly.* Since the start of Operation Epic Fury, Iranian drones and missiles have struck a stunning list of U.S. assets, including missile defense radars, logistics hubs, runways, early warning aircraft, [command and communications infrastructure](), and aerial refueling tankers. Iran has also shot down [45 MQ-9 drones](), [an F-15E fighter,]() and an A-10 attack jet, and threatened commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz for months. How is this possible? The U.S. and Israel destroyed much of Iran’s conventional air force and high-end missile defenses in the year leading up to the war and in its opening days. And if this is what a fight with Iran looks like, what about a fight with China’s People’s Liberation Army, which is far better equipped? Turns out, “air superiority” is [more complicated]() than you might think. Many Americans who grew up as the U.S. dominated the skies over Iraq and Afghanistan might think of air superiority as a giant blanket that prevents the enemy from doing anything in the sky. But the Air Force [defines]() air superiority as “that degree of control of the air by one force that permits the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from air and missile threats.” In other words, the enemy can fight back with aircraft and missiles, but if you can accomplish your mission, then you have achieved a degree of air superiority. Even in Desert Storm, considered the apogee of American airpower by many experts, U.S. aircraft faced real risk below 12,000 feet. [According]() to the Government Accountability Office, two-thirds of U.S. Air Force aircraft shot down in that war were shot down below that altitude, where Iraqi anti-aircraft artillery could still reach and infrared-guided surface-to-air missiles could lock on without the loud signatures emitted by higher-end radar threats. Nuance or no, the term “air superiority” does not appear in [Air Force Doctrine Publication 1](), which lays out the service’s core roles and responsibilities. Instead, the document focuses on airpower, which it defines as “the ability to project military power through control and exploitation in, from and through the air.” Air superiority is ideal, but it’s not the only way to be air-powerful. However, delivering airpower is more difficult now, because modern technology has made low-level airspace much more dangerous. The proliferation of relatively cheap missiles, one-way attack drones, commercial satellite imagery, and open-source intelligence means it’s much easier to [strike the “nests,”]() the support infrastructure that makes U.S. airpower possible. ![A U.S. Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft approaches a KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft to refuel in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility July 22, 2026. (U.S. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Adriana Jordan-Alcaniz)]() *An Air Force F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft approaches a KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft to refuel in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility on July 22, 2026. Air Force photo by Senior Airman Adriana Jordan Alcaniz.* By targeting U.S. nests in Epic Fury, Iran has made it more difficult for U.S. aircraft to protect ships in the Strait of Hormuz, arguably the most critical terrain of the conflict. Airpower expert Kelly Grieco, a senior fellow at the Stimson Center, says Iran’s strategy is one of “air denial.” The goal is not to gain air superiority but to stop the U.S. from achieving it. Air denial raises the cost for the adversary to move through the airspace so that their objective — securing the Strait of Hormuz — remains out of reach. The U.S. military hasn’t made things easier for itself. Mark Cancian, a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, notes that the aircraft Iran hit on the ground were nearly perfect targets: parked out in the open, wingtip to wingtip, in the same parking spots they’ve used for decades of conflict across the Middle East. This would be bad in a fight with China. In [war games]() simulating a Taiwan conflict, Cancian found that 90 percent of U.S. aircraft losses happened on the ground. He believes the Air Force needs to fortify its bases across the Pacific with hardened aircraft shelters and the ability to rapidly repair damaged runways. ![Image: U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (Nov. 23, 2025) Low-cost Unmanned Combat Attack System (LUCAS) drones are positioned on the tarmac at a base in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) operating area, Nov. 23. The LUCAS platforms are part of a one-way attack drone squadron CENTCOM recently deployed to the Middle East to strengthen regional security and deterrence. (Courtesy Photo) ]() *A set of Low-cost Unmanned Combat Attack System (LUCAS) drones are staged on a tarmac in the Middle East in November 2025. U.S. Central Command photo.* There are many other solutions which together could better prepare the U.S. for the direction air warfare is heading. To defend against cheap, swarming drone threats, the U.S. is developing [laser-guided rockets](), [signal jammers](), high-powered microwaves, proximity-fused cannon rounds, and drone interceptors, which can be made and distributed more affordably than high missiles such as the Patriot and THAAD. But Grieco says the U.S. ultimately needs a force that can fight without runways or expensive, irreplaceable platforms. She and her colleagues at the Stimson Center called for creating an “[inside air force](),” which could operate inside the range of enemy missiles and achieve the same kind of air denial against future adversaries that Iran has achieved against the U.S. The “inside air force” would not replace the high-end, runway-dependent platforms that make up the bulk of the U.S. fleet today. But it would require trade-offs, a clear vision of U.S. security goals, and a commitment to achieving them. For more on what the Iran war means for the changing nature of air warfare, [check out our YouTube video here](). ## Author David Roza writes scripts about military news for the Task & Purpose YouTube channel, and he also writes articles about military pay, benefits, health care, child care, culture, and other personnel topics on a freelance basis. Roza previously covered the Air Force and Space Force for Task & Purpose from 2019 to 2023 and for Air & Space Forces Magazine from 2023 to 2025. In the course of that reporting, he has set off a ‘Hollywood explosion’ with Air Force bomb techs, turned the (unarmed) keys of a nuclear missile bunker, hovered over the Nevada desert on an Air Force rescue helicopter, and got the best sleep of his life on the floor of a C-17 over the central Pacific. Share tips and story ideas with David at [david.roza@teamrecurrent.io]()